Owner sues Lee County over former Candy Factory strip club rezoning

New classification doesn’t allow for adult entertainment; county denies making procedural error

DIXON – The owner of a former strip club is suing Lee County over a zoning change that he says is killing his business and costing him and his investors, who are renovating the Compton business, hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Albert Bruno, a Norridge-based business developer, bought the former Candy Factory at 2849 U.S. Route 30 on Jan. 23, 2018, and said he has invested about $350,000 in the two-story building, built in 1936, with plans to once again make it a viable gentlemen’s club, with video gambling.

The site, at the intersection of U.S. routes 30 and 251, first was rezoned from general business district and granted a special use permit to establish an adult entertainment business on Jan. 16, 2007, when it was owned by a company called Jalapeno Pepe’s Inc.

Because it had been closed for so long, the county began the process of changing the zoning classification from heavy industrial, which is the only classification that allows adult entertainment in the county.

On June 6, citing the long closure of the business, the Lee County Zoning Board of appeals submitted two petitions, one to revoke a special use permit for the property and one to change the zoning to general business.

A public hearing on the petitions was held July 6, and Bruno attended and voiced his objections. The zoning board nonetheless approved the petitions, and on July 20, the County Board also approved the changes.

Bruno’s Southwest 2849 LLC filed suit on Sept. 15, seeking a judicial review of the decisions, their reversal, an injunction that would prevent future such actions, and unspecified damages.

The changes effectively prevent Bruno’s company “from using and enjoying its property in keeping with its investment-backed expectations, essentially taking the plaintiff’s property without just compensation ...” he says in his complaint.

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Bruno’s argument:

The county’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious” and failed to take into account or meet the due process standards of something called the LaSalle Factors, a state Supreme Court precedent that governs what must be considered, the complaint says, when denying a special use permit. They are:

• The existing uses and zoning of nearby property.

• The extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions.

• The extent to which the destruction of property values promotes the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public.

• The relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed on the property owner.

• The suitability of the property for the zoned purposes.

• The length of time the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the context of land development in the area in the vicinity of the property.

The county’s own ordinance governing the due process standards the board must consider essentially mirrors LaSalle, the complaint argues.

An I-3 heavy industrial zoning with special use is compatible because zoning of the site, which is surrounded by farmland, vacant businesses and land owned by the Illinois Department of Transportation, was compatible with nearby zoning; the changes would be detrimental to the value of the property and goes against the plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations; the county presented no evidence at the hearing regarding the promotion of the health, safety, or welfare of the public or regarding any gain to the public that the changes would bring, that there is no public need for the revocation; and that, although the property indeed has been closed, the plaintiff has been working on it, spending “significant amounts of money” to bring it up to code, it says.

Now, “in order to use the property for any purposes, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars more will need to be invested,” the complaint says.

Lee County’s response to the complaint, filed Nov. 6:

The LaSalle Factors do not apply to the revocation of special use permits, and Lee County’s ordinance does not require LaSalle to be applied in a permit revocation, it argues repeatedly.

The county ordinances in question are 10-2A-3 and 10-2D-3.

According to 10-2A-3:

The zoning administrator is authorized to issue temporary use permits in appropriate circumstances for periods not to exceed ninety (90) days and to revoke them at his discretion. The zoning administrator shall revoke special use permits where said use has not been established (substantially underway) within one year from the date the special use was granted.

The county board may extend this one-year period for such time as it shall determine, for good cause and without further hearing before either the zoning board of appeals or the county board.

The zoning administrator shall monitor compliance with rules, regulations and standards imposed as a condition to the granting of a special use and shall impose penalties or recommend revocation of the special use permit to the county board in the event of any such noncompliance.

According to 10-2D-3:

In the case of property previously classified, other than pursuant to a countywide general map amendment, but not used for a purpose permitted, either as a principal or special use, in the district in which it was classified within one year from the date of its classification, or, if the use of said property has been discontinued for a continuous period of three (3) years, the board of appeals has the power to institute proceedings on its own motion to consider the reclassification of the property to another district.

And according to 10-2D-4, which governs a change in zoning, or map amendment, and which Bruno argues mirrors the LaSalle Factors:

The board of appeals shall consider the following standards, and make findings thereon, when evaluating a map amendment:

• The existing uses of nearby property.

• The extent property values will be diminished by any zoning restrictions.

• The extent to which the destruction of property values promotes the public health, safety and welfare.

• The gain to the public versus the hardship to the individual property owner.

• The suitability of the subject property for zoned purposes.

• The length of time the property has been vacant as zoned, considered in the context of land development in the vicinity of the subject property.

• The compatibility of the present, and proposed, classification with the comprehensive plan.

• Whether there is a public need in the neighborhood for the proposed use.

The Zoning Board considered all of 2D-4s factors when making its decision, and the county ordinance also does not apply to the revocation of a special use permit, and so the standards did not need to be applied, the county says in its answer to the complaint.

Dixon and Sterling attorney Thomas Whitcombe represents Bruno’s Southwest 2849 LLC; Lee County State’s Attorney Charley Boonstra and Assistant State’s Attorney Brian Brim represent the county.

A status hearing is Feb. 21 before Judge Douglas Lee.

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Kathleen Schultz

Kathleen A. Schultz

Kathleen Schultz is a Sterling native with 40 years of reporting and editing experience in Arizona, California, Montana and Illinois.